

Message Text

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 ACDA-12 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10
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FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1175
AMCONSUL BOMBAY
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMCONSUL MADRAS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 6485

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PORG
SUBJECT: MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS: NON-ALIGNED BUREAU MEETING IN
KABUL

REF: STATE 097545

1. POL COUNSELOR DISCUSSED NON-ALIGNED BUREAU MEETING IN KABUL
WITH MEA DIRECTOR FOR UN, RAMESH MULYE, PER INSTRUCTIONS REFTTEL
ON APRIL 24. MULYE, WHO RECENTLY RETURNED FROM INDIAN MISSION
AT UN, TOOK NOTE OF OUR POSITIONS BUT WAS GENERALLY RESERVED
IN HIS RESPONSES.

2. MIDDLE EAST: MULYE AGREED WITH DESIRABILITY OF AVOIDING
ACTIONS AT KABUL WHICH WOULD HARDEN POSITIONS BUT EXPRESSED
CONCERN THAT THE SLOW PACE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON,
UNLESS SPEEDED UP, WOULD BE IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN SHAPING THE
NAM STANCE. ASKED IF RECENT VISITS OF PRESIDENT ASSAD AND PRE-
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SIDENT BOUMEDIENNE'S SPECIAL ENVOY GAVE ANY INDICATION
OF LINE ARBS WOULD TAKE, MULYE SAID THAT ASSAD'S VIEWS WERE
REFLECTED IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE BUT THAT BOUMEDIENNE'S ENVOY
HAD DISCUSSED THE BUREAU MEETING IN GENERAL AND NOT THE MIDDLE
EAST. (FYI: IN THE ASSAD JOINT COMMUNIQUE, BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED
"GRAVE CONCERN" OVER ISRAELI "INTRANSIGENCE" IN OCCUPYING
ARAB TERRITORIES AND REFUSAL TO IMPLEMENT UN RESOLUTIONS,

AND IN FURTHER AGGRAVATING THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY ITS "LATEST BLATANT AGGRESSION.. AGAINST THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON" WHICH "HAD INCREASED THE DANGER OF A WIDER CONFLAGRATION". END FYI)

3. SOUTHERN AFRICA: MULYE SAID THAT WHAT THE NAM DID AT KABUL WOULD ENTIRELY FOLLOW THE AFRICAN LEAD. THE SPECIAL SESSION ON NAMIBIA WOULD CERTAINLY INFLUENCE THE NAM POSITION. HE ASKED IF WE ANTICIPATED ANY MOVEMENT ON RHODESIA BEFORE THE NAM MEETING, AND SAID THAT, IN ANY EVENT, HE WOULD EXPECT THAT THE NAM WOULD UNANIMOUSLY CHOOSE TO COMMENT/ (READ CONDEMN) THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT.

4. SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT: MULYE, WHO WE GATHER DEALT WITH DISARMAMENT MATTERS AT THE UN, EXPRESSED SOME SURPRISE THAT THE US HAD ACCEPTED THE "OVERALL PRIORITY OF PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT" ALONG WITH STEPS TOWARD HALTING THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS RACE AND PREVENTING FURTHER PROLIFERATION. WE HAD BEEN UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THIS PRIORITY EARLIER, HE SAID. MULYE REITERATED THE NON-ALIGNED POSITIONS THAT THERE WAS A "QUALITATIVE" DIFFERENCE IN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT AND THAT SOME NON-ALIGNED STATES FEARED THAT STEPS TOWARD CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT JEOPARDIZED THEIR RIGHTS TO SELF-DEFENSE. ON THE QUESTION OF CONSENSUS DECISION-MAKING, MULYE SAID THAT INDIA'S POSITION WAS IN FAVOR OF THE CONSENSUS APPROACH SO LONG AS IT WAS WORKABLE, BUT THAT A TIME MIGHT COME WHEN THE RULES OF PRO-CONFIDENTIAL

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CEDURE WOULD HAVE TO BE APPLIED. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT EVEN THOSE COUNTRIES WHO FAVORED THE ALTERNATIVE OF VOTING ON THE ISSUES WERE RELUCTANT TO TAKE UP THE OPTION UNLESS IT WAS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.

5. GUAM: MULYE NOTED THAT INDIA HAD PARTICIPATED IN ARRIVING AT THE CONSENSUS AT THE PAST UNGA BUT ALSO NOTED THAT THE CONSENSUS WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO SOME, WHO WOULD BE RAISING THE QUESTION AT KABUL. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT VIETNAM WAS THE INSTIGATOR.

6. KOREA: MULYE SAID THAT SINCE THE NORTH KOREANS WOULD BE AT KABUL, THEY WOULD PROBABLY ATTEMPT TO RAISE THE ISSUE AGAIN. HE REPEATED THE INDIAN POSITION THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE ISSUE SETTLED BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS AND SAID THAT, FOR HIS OWN PART, HE HAD BEEN RELIEVED WHEN THE KOREAN QUESTION WAS OMITTED FROM THE UN AGENDA IN RECENT YEARS.

7. MASS MEDIA: MULYE AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A GREATER AS WELL AS BETER BALANCED FLOW OF INFORMATION IN THE WORLD. BUT HE DID NOT AGREE THAT IMPROVING THE MEDIA CAPABILITIES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO OBTAIN BALANCE. HE SAID THAT THERE MUST ALSO BE AN EFFORT AT "EDUCATION" IN

ORDER TO CORRECT MISAPPREHENSIONS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
WHILE HE DID NOT SAY SO, IT STRUCK US THAT HE WAS ADVOCATING
PROPAGANDA AS A LEGITIMATE FUNCTION OF DEVELOPING-COUNTRY MASS
MEDIA.

8. HUMAN RIGHTS: MULYE SAID THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT HUMAN RIGHTS
TO COME UP IN THE KABUL CONTEXT. HE THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE IT MIGHT
BE RAISED AT BELGRADE, BUT THAT INDIA FOR ONE DID NOT INTEND TO
RAISE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, GIVEN CROWDED AGENDA FOR THE BRIEF
KABUL MEETING.

9. PUERTO RICO AND CUBA: IN EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF,
MULYE SAID THAT THE GOI FULLY UNDERSTOOD US POSITION ON PUERTO
RICO, BUT THAT IT COULD NOT GUARANTEE A RESERVATION IN ADVANCE
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SINCE ITS POSITION WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT LANGUAGE CAME OUT OF THE
BUREAU MEETING. HE WAS NOT ALL THAT SURE THAT THE CUBANS WOULD
PUSH PUERTO RICO AT KABUL. AS FOR THE CUBAN ROLE IN NAM, MULYE
WAS VERY CIRCUMSPECT. HE SAID THAT WHILE A NUMBER OF AFRICAN
COUNTRIES MAY HAVE EXPRESSED "CONCERN PRIVATELY", THE CUBAN ROLE
HAD NEVER SURFACED IN BUREAU MEETINGS IN NEW YORK. HE ALSO
THOUGHT THAT SINCE THE ETHIOPIAN-SOMALIAN SITUATION HAD DEFUSED
SOMEWHAT, THERE WAS LESS LIKELIHOOD OF A CONFRONTATION SURFACING
AT KABUL
GOHEEN

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